As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called µ-additivity. We find that µ-Additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, Anonymity and Continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by O'Neill (1982) 
Introduction
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* Corresponding Author Email addresses: jose.alcalde@ua.es (José Alcalde), carmen.marco@upct.es (María del Carmen Marco-Gil), alasur@merlin.fae.ua.es (José A. Silva) 1 IUDESP, University of Alicante 2 Dep. of Economics, Polytechnic University of Cartagena 3 IUDESP and Dep. Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica, University of Alicante in Spain, it is expected that the number of (regional) saving banks will be drastically reduced from 45 in 2009 to 20 after the restructuring process in which the financial sector is involved. The reasons justifying why firms merge include the effort to gain market power, tax advantages of taking over a loss making firm, efficiency, increasing market share and diversification among other factors. Simultaneously to this merging wave, we found that the number of firms going bankrupt has also grown. This fact can be partially explained by the global financial crisis.
What this paper tries to explain is how the debtors of a bankrupted firm should be reimbursed. Taking into account that they could not avoid, nor promote, any merging process, the procedure employed to solve our problem should be neutral to the presence of any merging process. By neutrality we mean that what each creditor would lose, due to the bankruptcy situation,
should not be affected by any entrepreneurial alliance. The question is quite simple but, as this paper will point out, its analysis is not trivial.
The particular way that we will model this economic problem allows it to be also applied to some other distribution situations like how to share out a deceased estate among its inheritors, the design of (multi-issues) tax or tariff systems, etc. Therefore, we will follow the approach introduced by O'Neill (1982) , when formulating solutions for bankruptcy problems. The analysis of bankruptcy problems can be considered a simple and robust tool to model how agents should be rationed. In these situations, each agent in a group asks for a quantity of a perfectly divisible good, but the available amount is not enough to satisfy all the agents' demands.
The literature proposes mainly two approaches to provide satisfactory so-lutions for these problems. The first one, the axiomatic analysis, proposes particular solutions arising from the assumption that some 'Equity Principles' should prevail. The study by Thomson (2003) provides a nice overview of the main results following this methodology. The second approach is based on a interpretation of bankruptcy problems as (transferable utility) cooperative games, TU-games henceforth. This formulation, introduced by O'Neill (1982) , has been employed to argue in favor of some particular rules. Regarding this, see the papers by O'Neill (1982) and Aumann and Maschler (1985) .
This close relationship between bankruptcy situations and cooperative
games might well lead to analyze how strong the liaison between both frameworks is. When concentrating on solutions for TU-games, and related to properties reflecting neutrality on the distributive process, additivity is one of the most extensively imposed requirements. In fact, the fulfillment of this property has been extensively demanded in a huge family of allocation problems analyzed from a co-operative perspective. Just as an illustrative example, Moretti and Patrone (2008) refers to the Shapley value application to cost allocation, social networks, water issues, biology, reliability theory and belief formation. It is well-known that, in his seminal paper, Shapley (1953) pointed out the additivity of the value he proposed.
When concentrating on bankruptcy situations, additivity of a solution imposes, as in TU-games frameworks, neutrality on the distributive process.
Just to illustrate it, let us consider a creditor lending some funds to two firms, say A and B. After a merging process, involving both firms the new corporation, to be called C, bankrupts. When reimbursing this corporation's creditors, one can propose two ways to proceed. The first one is considering the problem of (partially) reimbursing C's creditors; whereas the second one lies in solving the 'primitive' problems related to A and B with respect to their creditors. What additivity should require is that both processes yield the same outcome.
As far as we know, the paper by Bergantiños and Méndez-Naya (2001) is the only one which explores additivity in Bankruptcy frameworks. Their conclusions in that matter can be summarized as follows:
(1) There is no bankruptcy rule satisfying additivity; and (2) If we concentrate on a (very restrictive) family of bankruptcy problems, the Ibn Ezra's rule is the only one which conciliates additivity and
Therefore, what Bergantiños and Méndez-Naya (2001) points out is that additivity is a very demanding property in our framework. 4 Moreover, if we want to explore bankruptcy rules that, being well-defined for any problem, satisfy some weak version of additivity, we must limit ourselves to considering rules that coincide with the Ibn Ezra's proposal in the framework in which it is defined.
Taking into account the above restrictions, this paper proposes a weak notion of additivity, that we call µ-Additivity, and a study of the bankruptcy rules satisfying it. What we find is that the only rule for which anonymity, continuity and µ-Additivity are compatible is the Minimal Overlap Rule, introduced by O'Neill (1982) .
Anonymity and Continuity are two properties which have been widely justified in the literature for Bankruptcy problems. What µ-additivity would suggest is that additivity should be a requirement for comparable problems, from the creditors' point of view. Following this interpretation, and trying to be precise in describing when two bankruptcy problems are comparable, we consider three elements:
(1) For any two agents, their relative credits are similar, i.e. the agent conceding the highest credit is the same for both problems;
(2) For each agent, her credit position, related to the debtor's assets is similar, i.e. her credits exceed the creditor's assets in a problem, this situation should not be reversed in the other; and (3) The sacrifice that each agent would impose on her 'rivals', if her credit is the first to be paid, should always (or never) be lower than such a credit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the main definitions related to bankruptcy problems. Section 3 discusses the notion of Additivity from a bankruptcy perspective and, based on some impossibility results, introduces the notion of 'Partial Additivity'.
Section 4 provides our main result, consisting on an axiomatization of the Minimal Overlap Rule based on the weak additivity property, discussed in the previous section. Technical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Bankruptcy. The Framework and Main Definitions.
Let us consider an individual, the debtor, having some debts. Let N = {1, . . . , i, . . . , n} denote the set of her creditors, that will be considered fixed throughout the paper. E ≥ 0 will denote the valuation of the debtor's assets, and will be called the Estate. For any fixed creditor, say i, c i ≥ 0 will denote her credit, i.e. the quantity that the debtor owes to her. Vector
. . , c n ) summarizes creditors' claims. We say that the debtor goes bankrupt if she has not enough assets to reimburse her debts.
Following the above, a bankruptcy problem can be fully described by a
Note that Condition (1) reflects that reimbursing creditors' debts might be incompatible. Therefore, these agents' aspirations (on recovering their debts) would be rationed. Let B denote the family of all the bankruptcy problems. For notational convenience, we describe the set of bankruptcy problems having a 'super-creditor', i.e. an individual whose credit is not lower than the estate, as
and, for any family of bankruptcy problems, say B ⊆ B, B O will denote the subclass of problems with increasingly ordered claims
Among the many rules that have been explored in the literature, we will introduce those two that will be most useful in our analysis.
5 The first one, to be called Ibn Ezra's rule, is a 'semi-solution' in the sense that it is not defined for every problem. The second one, known as the Minimal Overlap rule, was proposed by O'Neill (1982) as a possible extension of Ibn Ezra's rule to be defined for any problem.
In order to properly define the above rules, let us consider a problem
We say that it is an Ibn Ezra's problem if and only if it has a super-creditor.
Definition 2. Ibn Ezra's rule is the function ϕ IE : B S → R n + , associating to each problem (E, c) ∈ B O S , and creditor i, the amount
where c 0 = 0.
Chun and Thomson (2005) proposes a formal description for the Minimal
Overlap rule. What these authors suggest is to proceed as follows. Let us 5 As we have already mentioned, the reader can find a nice and complete overview of the most relevant Bankruptcy rules in Thomson (2003) . 6 For expository simplicity and technical convenience, we assume that creditors' claims are increasingly ordered. Otherwise, we can re-arrange the creditors' labels to reach this objective. Therefore, even though this assumption is proposed, the Ibn Ezra's and Minimal
Overlap rules are also defined when the agents' claims are not increasingly ordered.
consider a bankruptcy problem (E, c) ∈ B O , then what each creditor recovers is described as follows:
then there is a unique t ≥ 0 such that
In such a case, the Minimal Overlap rule associates to creditor i the
Recently, Alcalde et al. (2008) found an alternative expression for the Minimal Overlap rule, which is equivalent to the one introduced by Chun and 
where ϕ cel stands for the Constrained Equal Losses rule and the 'residual' bankruptcy problem, to which the Ibn Ezra's rule was not applied, is described by E r = max {E − c n , 0}, and c r = c − ϕ IE (min {E, c n } , c). 
Additivity and Bankruptcy Rules
The aim of this section is to introduce a discussion on the notion of additivity in the framework of bankruptcy problems. Just to illustrate it, let us consider the following example. A creditor, say i, loans some quantity to two firms, say F and G. Let c we can have that
What creditor i would expect to obtain at the division process, for any Bankruptcy rule, say ϕ is
Note that, otherwise, i could claim that she has been 'punished' due to the merging process, and she would not have the ability to object against such a decision made by the two firms. If such an argument is extended to all the creditors we have that the above inequality must become an equality. This is the essence of the additivity notion.
Definition 4. Let ϕ be a Bankruptcy rule. We say that it satisfies additivity if for any two problems, (E 1 , c 1 ) and (E 2 , c 2 ) we have that
Bergantiños and Méndez-Naya (2001) provided an example pointing out that additivity is a very demanding property for Bankruptcy rules. This is why they could show that there is no rule satisfying additivity.
Some reasons justifying this fact can be found. The first one lies in the relationship between bankruptcy problems and the TU-games, as suggested by O'Neill (1982) . This author proposed to associate to each bankruptcy problem (E, c) the TU-game (N , V ), where the characteristic function V : 2 N → R + assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N the amount
In this sense, Example 1 points out that additivity of bankruptcy problems might not induce additivity of the respective TU-games.
Example 1. Let us consider the following three-agent bankruptcy problems.
(E, c) = (9, (8, 8, 8) ), and (E , c ) = (31, (4, 12, 22)). Therefore, the aggregate bankruptcy problem is (E + E , c + c ) = (40, (12, 20, 30) ). Let V (resp. V , V ) denote the characteristic function relative to the problem (E, c) (resp.
(E , c ), (E + E , c + c )). Following Equation (10) Therefore, the TU-game induced by adding the two bankruptcy problems differs from the addition of the TU-games induced by both problems.
The second reason which explains that additivity is a strong requirement, comes from an economic perspective. Let us consider a company that can be seen as the result of a merging process involving some firms. When the company as a whole, goes bankrupt, the degree of bankruptcy, 8 is not usually homogeneous considering the firms that configure the company. This will justify the fact that not all the creditors should be rationed, taking into account the company's financial situation, but that of the firms receiving their credits. Therefore, what this situation suggests is that additivity, as introduced by Definition 4, might not be a reasonable property for Bankruptcy rules, unless the problems to be added share at least, a 'similar bankruptcy 8 Given a bankruptcy problem (E, c), we can define its degree of bankruptcy as the expression
degree'.
µ-Additivity and the Minimal Overlap Rule
The aim of this section is to describe reasonable conditions under which additivity is both satisfied by some bankruptcy rules and justified from an economic point of view. The main idea for our requirements starts from considering not only the 'degree of bankruptcy' as a comparison measure, but also what each creditor would impose on her 'rivals' as a sacrifice when her debts were completely reimbursed.
Just to formalize the above idea, let us consider the following scenario.
Given a bankruptcy problem (E, c), and an agent i ∈ N , E i = max {0, E − c i } denotes the amount that agents other than i would distribute after fully reimbursing (if possible) i's credits. We will denote by µ i (E, c) the (constrained egalitarian) loss in which agents, other than i, incur when i's credits have been, as much as possible, reimbursed; i.e. µ i (E, c) is the unique solution to
A notion for level of imposed sacrifice, by an agent to her rivals, would lie in how the above idea is related to such an agent's claim.
Definition 5. Given a bankruptcy problem (E, c), we say that agent i's claim is under-transferred if, and only if, µ i (E, c) < c i .
We now introduce a notion of partial additivity which is satisfied by some Bankruptcy rules.
Axiom 1. We say that a Bankruptcy rule, say ϕ, satisfies µ-Additivity if
for any two problems (E, c) and (E , c ) such that Note that what Axiom 1 suggests is that additivity should be preserved in problems sharing some similarities related to their internal structure:
(a) In both problems the agents' claims should be ordered in a similar way, i.e. if i's claim is greater that j's claim in a problem, it should not be the case that j's claim is greater that i's claim in the other. In order to present our main result, we need to introduce two axioms that are usually employed in Bankruptcy Theory. The first one, anonymity, establishes that what each creditor recovers does not depend on her name, 13 but on the internal structure of the problem. The second one is the classical requirement of continuity.
Axiom 2. We say that a Bankruptcy rule, say ϕ, satisfies Anonymity, or is anonymous, if for each problem (E, c) and any permutation 9 π,
Axiom 3. We say that Bankruptcy rule ϕ satisfies Continuity, or is continuous, if for each sequence of bankruptcy problems
We can now establish the following result, whose proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Let ϕ be a Bankruptcy rule. ϕ satisfies Anonymity, Continuity and µ-Additivity if, and only if, ϕ is the Minimal Overlap rule.
By way of conclusion, let us mention that Theorem 1 is tight in the sense that the uniqueness result requires all the three axioms, and no axiom is implied by the other two. Just to clarify that, let us note that:
9 A permutation π is a bijection applying N onto itself. In this paper, and abusing notation, π (c) will denote the claims vector obtained by applying permutation π to its components, i.e. proposal for any problem (E, c) such that E ≤ max i∈N , and otherwise, if P denotes the set of agents whose claims are under-transferred, Throughout this Appendix we assume, without loss of generality, that c is increasingly ordered i.e., c i ≤ c j whenever i < j. For simplicity of exposition, for a given problem (E, c) we denote c E the claims vector whose i-th component is c E i = min {c i , E}, for each agent i ∈ N . We first provide a result establishing that, under Continuity, µ-Additivity implies Invariance under Claims Truncation. Proposition 1. Let ϕ be a Bankruptcy rule satisfying µ-Additivity and Continuity. Then it satisfies Invariance under Claims Truncation, i.e. for each
Proof. Let ϕ be a rule satisfying µ-Additivity and Continuity. Let (E, c) be a problem where 0 < E < c n = max i∈N {c i }; and let S ⊂ N be the subset of agents claiming zero. Let us consider the following two cases.
Case 1: c n = c n−1 or c n−1 < E Therefore, by µ-Additivity,
Now, by considering the limit when r goes to infinity in the previous equation and taking into account that ϕ is continuous, we obtain
Case 2: E ≤ c n−1 < c n By µ-Additivity,
for all r ∈ N such that 1 r < min min i∈N \S {c i } , max i∈N :E<c i <cn {c i − E} , 2 (c n − c n−1 ) . Now, by considering the limit when r goes to infinity in the previous equation and taking into account that ϕ is continuous, we obtain
Proof of Theorem 1
Firstly, it is straightforward to verify that the Minimal Overlap rule satisfies Anonymity, Continuity and µ-Additivity. Now, let ϕ be a rule satisfying these axioms. Given a problem (E, c) ∈ B, let us consider the following two cases:
n−1 . Let q (j) denote the cardinality of the set {i ≤ j: P i = 0} . By µ-Additivity
, max 0, c P i − 1 r (q (n) − 1) j∈N + +ϕ P n − 1 r (q (n) − 1)
, 0, min c p i , 1 r 1<i<n , c
where r ∈ N is such that 1 r < min 1 − 1 q (n) P n , min 19 Now, by considering the limit when r goes to infinity in the previous equation, by Continuity we obtain ϕ E, c E = i∈N ϕ P i , c P i .
By using the reasoning of the Subcase 1.a above, we obtain that for each agent h ϕ h E, c E = ϕ
M O h
(E, c) .
Case 2: E > c n .
In such a case, there is a unique t, 0 ≤ t < c n , such that i∈N max {0, c i − t} = E − t.
Let k be the unique agent such that c k − t > 0, and c k−1 − t ≤ 0. Note that this implies that, for each agent j, with j ≤ k, we have that c j is under-transferred. Then, for each r ∈ N such that 1 r < min {E − t, (n − k − 1) (c k − t)} by µ-Additivity we have that,
ϕ (E, c) = ϕ t + above. By Continuity, we have ϕ (E, c) = ϕ t, (min {c i , t}) i∈N + ϕ E − t, (max {0, c i − t}) i∈N .
Observe that the problem t, (min {c i , t}) i∈N was analyzed in Case 1 above. Therefore, for each agent h, we have that 
